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Fichte and the Body in Action
M. Jorge de Carvalho
1  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  zoom  in  on  some  fundamental  aspects  of  Fichte’s
transcendental account of the body in action, as laid down in the introductory remarks
to his 1798 Sittenlehre.1
2  Before we plunge in medias res three things should be borne in mind.
3  First,  what  we are  dealing  with  here is  a  transcendental account.  This  means  Fichte
focuses on mere Vorstellungen, or to be more precise, on what he terms “das System des
nothwendigen Denkens”.2 On the  one hand,  the  point  is  that,  in  the  final  analysis,
everything we deal with has the nature of a Vorstellung –and that this holds true even
for what claims to be more than just a Vorstellung. On the other hand, the point is that
some Vorstellungen are absolutely necessary, both in the sense that they must occur (that
they  are  an  indispensable  condition  of  it  all)  and  in  the  sense  that  they  are  an
indispensable condition of one another and cannot occur without each other. 
4  Secondly,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  Fichte’s  view  one  of  these  necessary
representations is the representation of efficacious action (Wirksamkeit) – or, to be more
precise,  of  “first-person  efficacious  action”:  of  my  efficacious  action  or  of  “meine
Wirksamkeit”3 viz.  of  what  he  terms  “ efficacy  exercised  upon  something  outside  of  me
[Wirksamkeit auf etwas außer mir]”.4 It is the representation according to which at least
some of “my representations have an effect upon the world”:5 “something objective
results  from  what  is  subjective”6 –“a  being  corresponds  to  and  follows  from  our
representations”,7 so that we “take some of our representations to be the ground of a
being”8 (i.e., of things that supposedly exist independently of any representation).9
5  Among other things, Fichte draws attention to the fact that the representation of meine
Wirksamkeit is intrinsically complex: it cannot take place as a single representation of a
simple content. In other words, the representation of meine Wirksamkeit (of my own
efficacy or efficacious action) requires a manifold of representations – a complex set of
representations that are entailed in it.10 And here is where the body (N.B. my body viz.
one’ body) comes into play. Fichte claims that the representation of one’s body is part




cannot  take  place  without  the  former,  so  that  the  representation  of  one’s  body  is
necessarily contained and posited in the representation of one’s Wirksamkeit. 
6  And this is what “the body in action” is all about. Fichte speaks of the representation of
one’s own body as a condition sine qua non for the representation of one’s efficacious
action (Wirksamkeit). He speaks of my body as a Vorstellung – the point being that, in the
final analysis, my body is a complex set of representations. And he speaks of the body in
action – the point being that action is more than just a particular feature of one’s body
among  many  others:  the  representation  of  one’s  efficacious  action  is  rather  the
framework  within  which  the  representation  of  one’s  body  is  formed  –  it  is  what
constitutes one’s body (my body) as such. 
7  But this is not all. Thirdly it must be borne in mind that, in Fichte’s view, representing
one’s own body is not just an indispensable component without which there can be no
representation  of  one’s Wirksamkeit  –  as  if  the  latter  were  just  one  possible
representation among many others. His point is that “without this consciousness of my
own efficacy,  there is  no self-consciousness;  without  self-consciousness,  there is  no
consciousness of something else that is not supposed to be I myself”.11 In other words,
Fichte’s point is that the representation of my Wirksamkeit is an indispensable condition
for the representation of everything überhaupt –and that pretty much the same holds
true  for  the  representation  of  one’s  body:  as  a  necessary  component  of  the
representation  of  one’s  Wirksamkeit,  it,  too,  is  an  indispensable  condition  for  the
representation of everything überhaupt; so that according to him the representation of
one’s  own  body  plays  a  transcendental  role in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term:  it  is
somehow entailed in all our representations without exception. In short, one’s body is
the  very  opposite  of  what  it  seems  to  be  (a  contingent,  particular,  empirical
representation): it is necessary, anything but particular and anything but empirical: it
is  “contained in  consciousness  as  such and is  necessarily  posited  along with  it  [im
Bewußtseyn überhaupt enthalten, und mit demselben nothwendig gesetzt sey]”.12
8  With this by way of introduction, let us now plunge in medias res.
* * *
9  First  of  all,  Fichte  focuses  on  two  representations  that  are  entailed  in  the
representation of one’s Wirksamkeit – and indeed so much so that they are, as it were,
the two poles around which everything else revolves.
10  On  the  one  hand,  “I  act  efficaciously”  (ich  wirke)  is  not  possible  without  some
representation of myself: it all depends on the fundamental representation of the I viz.
of Ichheit (I-hood) – that is,  of subjectivity as such. My Wirksamkeit means: “I am the
ground of this change”,13 i.e.: “that which knows about this change is also that which
effectuates it”, so that “the subject of consciousness and the principle of efficacy are
one”.14 When I ascribe efficacious activity to myself I ascribe it to what is subjective in
me. “I posit myself absolutely as active”,15 so that the action in question “starts with
what is subjective, as determining what is objective”.16 The principle is “das Subjective”
–the action in question is originally determined by what is subjective (by myself,  by
what is subjective in me)– “and indeed so much so that what is subjective in me is not in
turn  determined  by  something  else  objective  but  is  determined  absolutely  in  and
through  itself  [nicht  wieder  durch  ein  anderes  objective  bestimmt  werden  kann,




11  When we speak of subjectivity and I-hood it should, of course, be borne in mind that
what we are talking about is not entirely free of an objective element. Fichte himself
emphasizes that “I make a distinction within myself between a knowing subject and a
real force, which, as such, does not know but is.”18 He points out that what is subjective
in me presupposes and requires something objective and vice versa, so that “I view the
two as absolutely one”.19 Or, as he also puts it, “I do not know anything about myself
without becoming something for myself through this knowledge –or, which is simply to
say the same thing, without separating something subjective in me from something
objective”.20 And, what is more, 
“through this very separation (…) the relation of what is subjective and what is
objective to each other is also immediately posited. What is objective is supposed to
subsist through itself, without any help from what is subjective and independently
of it. What is subjective is supposed to depend on what is objective and to receive its
material  determination  from  it  alone.  Being  exists  on  its  own,  but  knowledge
depends on being.”21
12  Fichte’s point is of course not that there is such a thing as an absolutely independent
being of the I, which is there regardless of whether there is any knowledge (any Wissen)
or not. He is speaking of the being of subjectivity itself – i.e. of the being of Wissen viz. of
knowledge (i.e. of something that simply does not exist if there is no Wissen). In other
words, Fichte’s point is precisely that in the case of the I there are not two completely
separate elements, subjectivity and objectivity. His point is that neither of them exists
without the other. His point is that in this case both elements result from a Trennung (a
separation) that is part and parcel of the representation of I-hood as such: 
“they [knowledge and being] are separated only within consciousness […] and it is
only through this separation that the two of them first arise. […] I am required to
bring about a separation simply in order to be able to say to myself “I”; and yet it is
only by saying “I” and only insofar as I say this that such separation occurs”.22
13  We can also express this by saying that the I is of such a nature that I must represent it
both as something I know because it is and as something which is only because I know it: “I
know myself because I am, and I am because I know myself [ich weiß von mir dadurch,
daß ich bin und bin dadurch, daß ich von mir weiß]”.23 And when Fichte emphasizes
that in this case too what is subjective is supposed to depend on what is objective, etc.,
he is only stressing the fact that subjectivity or Wissen, too, has a cognitive relation to
itself, and that this cognitive relation of subjectivity viz. Wissen to itself is such that it
“witnesses” its own being and sees its knowledge of itself as determined by its own
being.
14  But be that as is may (and even if there is no “chemically pure” subjectivity), the crucial
point is that in order for there to be any efficacious activity of mine, activity must be
started and determined by what is subjective (not by what is objective) in me. The action
is mine if and only if it stems from the subjective in me. If it stems from something else,
then the I (the subjective in me) does not start and determine the action in question:
even if the I is there and plays a certain role, it is not itself the agent, it is acted upon (or
it plays the role of the agent only insofar as it is acted upon –which amounts to saying
that it is not the agent at all). The result being that, in the final analysis, the action (the
Wirksamkeit)  is  not  mine.  Or,  as  Horace  puts  it,  if  the  action  is  not  started  and
determined by what is subjective in me, “duc[or] ut nervis alienis mobile lignum”24 –I
am not the agent of the activity in question; I am just a means (a link in the chain) of




15  But this is not all. On the other hand, there is a second absolute requirement without
which  it  is  impossible  to  represent  such  a  thing  as  meine  Wirksamkeit.  As  Fichte
emphasizes, when I ascribe activity to myself “this certainly does not mean that I ascribe
to myself activity in general, but rather that I ascribe to myself a determinate activity,
precisely this  one and not the other [eine bestimmte ,  gerade eine solche,  und keine
andere]”.26 But an activity “becomes determinate or determined” “merely by having
some resistance posited in opposition to it  – posited in opposition: that is to say, a
resistance that is thought by means of ideal activity and imagined to be standing over
against  the  latter”.27 In  short:  “Wherever  and  whenever  you  see  activity,  you
necessarily see resistance as well, for otherwise you see no activity”.28
* * *
16  Now, on the one hand, this means that no activity can be represented without an object
(without the object it  is related to:  without its object). On the other hand, it also means
that the object in question is necessarily represented as something objective – that is, as
something of such a nature that in relation to it I (the subjective in me) am “entirely
dependent and thoroughly constrained”,29 in the sense that “ I have to consider myself
purely  as  a  cognizing  subject  and,  in  this  cognition,  entirely  dependent  upon
objectivity”.30 In other words, even if what is at stake is the representation of subjective
action (i.e. of something started and determined by what is subjective in me, so that
what is objective is determined by what is subjective, and not the other way around),
the very representation of subjective action requires the representation of something
objective, that is of something that is supposed to be there regardless of whether it is
represented or not – and indeed so much so that, in this case, what is subjective (my
representation of it) “is supposed to be determined by what is objective, and not vice
versa”.31 And this is why Fichte speaks of resistance – and indeed of resistance to what
he terms my ideal activity. The point is that the object of my action must be represented
as something being there in the sense that it impinges itself upon my Vorstellung and binds
my Vorstellung to what is there anyway, so that the ideale Thätigkeit sees itself bound by –
and to– something independent of it.32
17  But  this  is  still  not  all;  for  Fichte  “develops  the  distinctive  features  of  this
representation  of  resistance”  and  “does  so  merely  from  the  manner  in  which  it
originates”.33 According to him, 
“this resistance is represented as the opposite of activity [als das Gegentheil der
Thätigkeit vorgestellt], hence as something that merely endures, lying there quietly
and dead [als etwas nur bestehendes, ruhig, und todt vorliegendes], as something
that  merely  is and in  no way acts [das  da bloß ist,  keineswegs aber handelt ],  as
something that strives only to continue to exist and thus resists the influence of
freedom upon its territory only with that degree of force that is required to remain
what it is,  but is never able to attack the latter in its own territory [das nur zu
bestehen strebt, und daher allerdings mit eimem Maaße von Kraft zu bleiben was es
ist, der Einwirkung der Freiheit auf seinem eigenen Boden widersteht, nimmermehr
aber  dieselbe  auf ihrem  Gebiet  anzugreifen  vermag].  In  short,  resistance  is
represented as mere objectivity [bloße Objectivität]. The proper name for something of
this sort is stuff [Stoff].”34
18  But what does this mean? First, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, it should be
underlined that according to Fichte the said features are what must characterize the




of any such action). Put another way, the point is that, regardless of whether it may
play other roles and therefore present other features, as long as it is represented as
something subject to my Wirksamkeit (as long as it is represented as the object of meine
Wirksamkeit) it is and must represented as mere Stoff.
19  Secondly, it should be borne in mind that Fichte is referring to two kinds of resistance,
not just to one. On the one hand, as pointed out above, the object of my Wirksamkeit
must resist what Fichte terms the ideal activity (ideale Thätigkeit): we cannot represent
the object of one’s Wirksamkeit without representing it as something that impinges itself
upon one’s Vorstellung and binds one’s Vorstellung to what is there anyway. But, on the
other hand, Fichte is also referring to the object’s resistance to the reale Thätigkeit 35–his
point is that, even if the object is represented as mere Stoff, it must be assigned at least
some degree of resistance to real activity i.e. of resistance to one’s Wirksamkeit, so that
the latter consists precisely in the power to overcome this resistance. In other words,
the object must have its own density, as it were; the fact a) that it has its own density
and offers at least some resistance to one’s Wirksamkeit and b) that this resistance is
overcome is what gives reality to one’s action (what makes it real Wirken, real efficacy, real
action).
20  But  thirdly,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  two  kinds  of  resistance  are
intrinsically connected to each other. The point is that the object’s resistance to real
activity  viz.  to  one’s  Wirksamkeit  is  represented  as  stemming from  the  fact  that  its
independent existence (its being-itself-what-it-is – i.e. the very core of its resistance to
the ideal activity) is something intrinsically bound to itself and which therefore resists
any interference with itself. When Fichte contends that the object “strives to continue to
exist”  (zu  bestehen  strebt) “and  thus  resists  the  influence”  of  Wirksamkeit “upon  its
territory” (der Einwirkung der Freiheit auf seinem eigenen Boden widersteht), what he has in
mind is  this Gebundenheit  and not something incompatible with its  being mere Stoff
(that  is:  “etwas nur  bestehendes,  ruhig,  und  todt  vorliegendes,  das  da  bloß ist, 
keineswegs aber handelt”36).
21  So much for the I and objectivity.  Fichte calls them “the two extremes of the entire
world  of  reason”37 in  order  to  emphasize  that  all  our possible  representations  lie
between these  two extremes:  no representation goes beyond the one or the other,  for
there is  nothing more subjective than the I,  and nothing more objective than “the
absolutely self-posited being (of the material Stoff)”.38 In short, the representation of
the I is as subjective and the representation of what Fichte terms Stoff is as objective as a
representation can possibly be. Furthermore, Fichte’s point is that neither of these two
extremes has to do with a “chemically pure” subject or a “chemically pure” object. Both
entail objective as well as subjective elements. As pointed out above, the representation
of the I entails an indispensable objective component. And, contrary to what may seem,
the representation of “the absolutely self-posited being (of the material Stoff)” contains
an  indispensable  subjective  component.  When  all  is  said  and  done,  the  difference
between these two extremes concerns what might be termed the role played by the
subjective and the objective element, their “relation of forces” or, as Fichte puts it, “das
Verhältnis  des  subjectiven,  und  objectiven  zueinander”  (“the  relation  of  what  is
subjective and what is objective to each other”).39 In the case of the I, the subjective
element  is  the  pole  around  which  everything  revolves,  so  that  what  is  subjective
determines what is objective. In the case of the object viz. of what Fichte terms Stoff, it





22  But what interests us here is the fact that any representation of meine Wirksamkeit must
entail the representation of these two extremes and indeed in such a manner that they
play the role of  the two poles between which everything else takes place.  In other
words, the representation of meine Wirksamkeit covers the distance between the two
extremes in question, so that they define the interval – the whole field, as it were – of
one’s efficacious action, and the latter is defined by the fact that it reaches from one
extreme to the other. 
23  But  this  is  not  all;  for,  on  the  other  hand,  Fichte  also  stresses  the  fact  that  the
representation of these two extremes does not exhaust the manifold of representations
that are entailed in the representation of one’s efficacious action. 
24  In this respect, four things must be borne in mind. 
25  First,  all  the other  representations Fichte  refers  to  fall  within the interval  between
these two extremes, both in the sense that they are less subjective than the one and less
objective than the other and in the sense that they have to do with the representation
of what leads  from one extreme to  the  other  (or,  as  we might also say,  with a chain of
mediating instances between one extreme and the other). 
26  Secondly, this means that all the other representations that according to Fichte are also
entailed in the representation of meine Wirksamkeit  concern, as he puts it,  besondere
Ansichten – particular ways of looking at or particular aspects – of the relation (that is,
the separation and correspondence: the Trennung und Übereinstimmung)40 between what
is subjective and what is objective.41 In other words, what is at stake in each of these
various representations is a particular kind of connection between the subjective and the
objective element: what might be described in grammatical terms as an inflection or
declension des Verhältnisses des subjectiven,  und objectiven zueinander (of the relation of
what is subjective and what is objective to each other).
27  Thirdly,  Fichte’s  point  is  that  each of  these other representations he refers  to  is  as
indispensable for the representation of meine Wirksamkeit as the two said extremes. The
representation  of  the  extremes  alone  (I-hood  and  objectivity)  is  not  enough  to
constitute  a  representation  of  meine  Wirksamkeit:  everything  depends  on  the
representation  of  the  transition from  one  extreme  to  the  other  –  i.  e.  on  the
representation of the process leading from the I to objectivity. 
28  Fourthly,  what characterizes the manifold of representations Fichte refers to is utter
asymmetry: its unidirectional character. Meine Wirksamkeit is all about the transition from
what is subjective to what is objective – and not the other way around. Fichte expresses
this by speaking of the influence (Einwirkung) of what is subjective “upon the territory of
objectivity”, while the latter is unable to “attack the former in its own territory.” The
point  is  that  the  representation  of  such  a  thing  as  meine  Wirksamkeit entails  a
distribution of  different  roles:  it  is  all  about  the  subject’s  capacity  to  exert  influence
beyond its confines: in the territory of objectivity; it is all about the subject going beyond itself
and, as Fichte puts it, “attacking the object in its own territory”, so that the subject
plays the role of the agent while the object plays the role of what is acted upon. 
29  The above sets the framework for Fichte’s more detailed description of the manifold of
representations that are entailed as condiciones sine quibus non in the representation of




30  Fichte  gives  a  first  and  provisional  glimpse  of  this  manifold  in  section  4  of  the
Introduction.  The  representation  of  meine  Wirksamkeit must  include  a)  a
“representation  of  the  Stoff  that  endures  while  I  am  acting  efficaciously  and  is
absolutely  unchangeable  thereby”  (die  Vorstellung  des  bei  meiner  Wirksamkeit
fortdauernden und durch sie  nicht  zu  verändernden Stoffes),  b)  a  “representation of  the
properties of this Stoff, properties that are changed by my efficacy” (die Vorstellung der
Beschaffenheiten  des  Stoffes,  die  durch  meine  Wirksamkeit  verändert  werden), c)  a
“representation  of  this  progressive  process  of  change”  (die  Vorstellung  der
fortschreitenden Veränderung),  which continues d)  “until  the shape that I  intended is
there” (bis die Gestalt dasteht, die ich beabsichtigte).42 This first and provisional glimpse
(which focuses primarily on the representation of the object of meine Wirksamkeit) is
completed in sections 7, 8, and 9, where more attention is paid to the complexity of
what is subjective viz. of what leads from the subject to the object. 
31  In  sections  7,  8  and  9  Fichte  describes  in  the  following  terms  the  manifold  of
representations  that  are  required  if  there  is  to  be  any  representation  of  meine
Wirksamkeit: 
a) The action must be represented in such a way that its starting point is the unified
and indivisible I (das Eine, untheilbare Ich), insofar as what is subjective in me has the
power to reach out beyond its own bounds towards what is objective in me, so that
“that which acts upon the body” (viz. upon objective being, upon the Stoff) “is what is
objective in me, the real force” (dies objective in mir, die reelle Kraft).43
32  b) I cannot represent this activity otherwise than as the “causality of a concept”:44 as
“the causality of a mere concept exercised on what is objective, and to this extent the
concept in question is not in turn determined by something else that is objective but is
determined absolutely in and through itself.”.45 In other words, this activity cannot be
represented  otherwise  than  as  the  designing  of  a  concept (“Entwerfen  eines  […]
Begriffs”)46 – of a concept from which an objective determination is to follow (“aus
welchem  eine  objective  Bestimmung  erfolgen  soll”).47 The  representation  of  meine
Wirksamkeit must  take  the  shape  of  the  representation  of  being  as  arising  from  a
concept (“ein Seyn aus einem Begriffe”).48 In short, my activity must be represented as
a Zweckbegriff  (as the concept of an end).49 Or, as Fichte puts it, I  must “presuppose a
concept  designed  by  myself  [einen  von  mir  selbst  entworfenen  Begriff],  which  is
supposed  to  guide  my  efficacious  acting  and  in  which  the  latter  is  both  formally
grounded and materially determined”.50
c) But this is not all. As Fichte points out, I cannot represent meine Wirksamkeit without
adding something else –namely “the representation of a will” (die Vorstellung eines
Willens).51As he puts it, it is indispensable that the concept itself appears to me as
something objective (daß der Begriff selbst mir als etwas objectives erscheine);52 that is, I
must also represent the transition from the Zweckbegriff as such to its realization. I must
represent the change by means of which the Zweckbegriff becomes more objective than
itself (this is what Fichte is talking about when he writes that “the concept of an end,
viewed objectively, is called an act of willing”;53 i.e., I must represent myself as really
acting or my Zweckbegriff as having a real effect upon what is objective (auf den Stoff
wirkend).54 Or, as Fichte also puts it, I must represent something subjective in me as
transformed into something objective, the concept of an end as transformed into a
decision of the will (ein Subjectives in mir selbst sich in ein Objectives, der Zweckbegriff in einen




one by means of which it reaches out beyond its own bounds towards what is objective
and has an effect upon Stoff.
33  d) “Now I am supposed to have an effect upon […] Stoff. But it is impossible for me to
think of this Stoff as being affected by anything other than something that is itself Stoff”
(aber es ist mir unmöglich eine Wirkung auf ihn zu denken, außer durch das, was selbst Stoff
ist).56 “Consequently, since I do – as I must – think of myself as having an effect on this
Stoff, I also become for myself Stoff (wie ich mich daher, wie ich muß, wirkend denke auf ihn,
werde ich mir selbst zu Stoff); and insofar as I view myself in this way, I call myself a
material  body.  Viewed  as  a  principle  of  efficacy  in  the  world  of  bodies,  I  am  an
articulated body (bin ein artikulierter Leib); and the representation of my body is itself
nothing  but  the  representation  of  myself  as  a  cause  in  the  world  of  bodies  and is
therefore indirectly only a certain way of looking at my own absolute activity” (und die
Vorstellung  meines  Leibes  selbst  ist  nichts  anderes,  denn  die  Vorstellung  meiner  selbst,  als
Ursache in der Körperwelt,  mithin mittelbar nichts anderes,  als eine gewisse Ansicht meiner
absoluten Thätigkeit).57 
34  In this regard, Fichte emphasizes two points. 
35  On  the  one  hand,  he  stresses  the  fact  that  “the  will  is  supposed  to  exercise  […]  an
immediate causality upon my body”, so that “the body as an instrument, that is, the
articulated body [die Artikulation] extends only as far as this immediate causality of
the will extends”.58 The will is therefore also different from the body, and it appears as
not  being  the  same  as  the  body  (der  Wille  wird daher  vom  Leibe  auch  unterschieden;
erscheint daher nicht als dasselbe.”59 In other words, what constitutes one’s body as such
is first the fact that it is represented as Stoff  and secondly the fact that the Stoff in
question is represented as directly controlled by one’s will, so that the will can have an
immediate effect upon it.60 One’s body is that part of the field of objectivity (i. e., that
part of what is represented as exterior to one’s will and exterior to one’s I-hood) that
can be immediately acted upon by one’s will. In short, one’s body has to do with the
representation of “something subjective in me transformed into something objective”,
only that this time what is at stake is not the transformation “of a Zweckbegriff into a
decision  of  the  will”,  but  rather  “the  transformation  of  the  latter  into  a  certain
modification of my body”.61 The emphasis is therefore on the contrast between Wille
and Stoff viz. between will and body. 
36  But,  on  the  other  hand,  Fichte  also  emphasizes  a  second  point.  He  writes:  “This
distinction, however, is nothing more than yet another separation of what is subjective
from what is  objective,  or more specifically,  it  is  a particular aspect of the original
separation. In this relationship the will is what is subjective and the body is what is
objective (der Wille ist in diesem Verhältnisse das Subjective, und der Leib das Objective).”62
And in section 9 he speaks of something that “is entirely the same (…), simply viewed
from a different side” (ganz dasselbe (…), nur angesehen von einer anderen Seite) – so that
“the causality of the concept with respect to what is objective” appears, “respectively,
as will  and as body when viewed from different sides”.63 The point seems to be the
following: my body is not just that part of the realm of Stoff which is represented as
being  immediately  under  the  power  of  my  will  (and  which  therefore  can  be
immediately changed by my will). If this were all there were to it, then the body would
not appear as part of me – it would not be endowed with I-hood: it would not be my body. It
would appear as the nearest part of what is exterior or as the first field of implementation




point is that what constitutes my body as such is not only this, but rather an equation
between will and Stoff: an equation owing to which my acts of will and the immediate
material starting points of my intervention in the realm of Stoff are equated with each
other. In short, what constitutes my body is the fact that I represent such a thing as Stoff 
with will (with my will) or my will as Stoff (and this means Stoff with I-hood or I-hood as
Stoff). In section 8 Fichte insists on this point almost ad nauseam: 
“wie ich mich daher, wie ich muß, wirkend denke auf ihn, werde ich mir selbst zu
Stoff; und inwiefern ich so mich erblicke nenne ich mich einen materiellen Leib. Ich,
als Prinzip einer Wirksamkeit in der Körperwelt angeschaut,  bin ein artikulierter
Leib,  und  die  Vorstellung  meines  Leibes  selbst  ist  nichts  anderes,  denn  die
Vorstellung meiner selbst als Ursache in der Körperwelt”.64 
37  The emphasis is therefore not on the contrast between Wille and Stoff (viz. between will
and body), but on the contrast between myself (including my body) and what is exterior.65 
38  e) But this is not all. The manifold of representations that are required if there is to be
any  representation  of  meine  Wirksamkeit must  include  still  other  elements.  Fichte
focuses on what he terms “my actual causality” (meine wirkliche Kausalität),  and “the
change that it is supposed to ensue thereby in the sensible world” (die Veränderung, die
dadurch  in  der  Sinnenwelt  erfolgen  soll).66 And  not  surprisingly  he  contrasts  the
modifications of my body with all other modifications in the realm of Stoff (i.e. with the
whole range of non-immediate effects of my will upon what is exterior to me). 
“Insofar as something subjective in me is transformed into something objective, the
concept of an end into a decision of the will, and the latter in turn into a certain
modification of my body: to this extent, I obviously represent myself as changed.
But this last item that I attribute to myself, my physical body, is supposed to be
connected with the entire world of bodies;  and thus if  the former is intuited as
changed, so is the latter necessarily viewed as changed as well.”67 
39  In other words, any representation of meine Wirksamkeit must include a representation
of the connection between my body (that is my will as body) and the exterior – or, to be
more precise, it must include a representation of my body as a centre of action upon
other bodies viz. other Stoff.
40  And in this respect Fichte emphasizes two points. On the one hand, he repeats and
explains his thesis concerning what is changeable and unchangeable in the realm of
Stoff, insofar as Stoff is acted upon by my will and constitutes the object of my action: 
“The  thing  that  can  be  changed  as  a  result  of  my efficacy,  that  is  the  specific
constitution or the properties of nature, is entirely the same as that which cannot
be changed; i.e., it is mere matter, simply viewed from a different side – just as,
above,  the  causality  of  the  concept  with  respect  to  what  is  objective  appeared,
respectively,  as  will  and  as  body  when  viewed  from  different  sides.  Viewed
subjectively  and  in  connection  with  me  as  an  active  subject  or  agent,  what  is
changeable is nature; what is unchangeable is this same nature, viewed entirely and
solely objectively, and this is unchangeable for the reasons indicated above.”68 
41  On the other hand, he points out that my body is represented not just as a centre of
action upon some other bodies, but as a centre of possible action upon all of them (upon
the whole realm of Stoff). In other words, not just part of the latter is represented as
being in connection with my body –that is with me– as an active subject or agent: what
characterizes the representation of my body is a universal network of possible actions
connecting it with everything else, so that everything else (and this means all Stoff) is





42  The above enables  us  to  highlight  some main features  of  Fichte’s  account  of  meine 
Wirksamkeit, in particular the following:
43  a)  Fichte  depicts  a  continuum of  mediation  between  the  two  extremes,  I-hood  and
objectivity, and the gradual transition from the more subjective and less objective to
the less subjective and more objective.  The main steps of  this  transition are 1)  the
subjective in me (I-hood), 2) the real force in me, 3) the Entwerfen von Zweckbegriffen, 4)
my will viz. my Willensentschlüße, 5) my body, 6) my body’s action upon other bodies, 7)
the action of other bodies upon other bodies. Furthermore, all subjective action upon
Stoff –and this means both 5), 6) and 7)– takes place in the realm of 8) what is changeable
in objectivity, as opposed to 9) what cannot be changed –the point being that the former is
more subjective and less objective than the latter, since the latter defines itself by the
fact that it remains completely out of reach of any subjective action. 
44  b)  This  continuum shapes the inner structure of  meine  Wirksamkeit:  the wave of  my
action, as it were; and the point is that 2) includes 1), while 3) includes 1) and 2), and 4)
includes 1), 2), and 3 – and so on and so forth; pretty much the same holds true for 7),
since the action of other bodies upon other bodies that is at stake here is the one that
results from my body’s intervention upon other bodies (i.e., from 6); as for 9), even if it
is  all  about  something  completely  impervious  to  subjective  action,  it  cannot  be
represented without representing the whole sequence from 1) to 8).
45  c) This continuum has to do with a transition from the one (I-hood: das Eine, untheilbare
Ich) to the many. Multiplicity comes into play in the transition from 1) to 2), while 3) –
the designing of Zweckbegriffe – stands not only for a new development step, but for one
that is intrinsically related to multiple Zweckbegriffe – to a manifold (and indeed to a “big
bang”) of possibilities; as pointed out above, 4) (will viz. my Willensentschlüße) has to do
with a second positing of 3), and there is no assignable limit to the representation of the
manifold of Stoff viz. of my immediate and mediate action upon it. On the other hand, it
should also be noted that the successive links of this continuum (viz. of this chain) of
meine  Wirksamkeit move  further  and  further  away  from  the  “source”,  namely  from the
subjective in me (viz. the most subjective in me: I-hood itself), but in such a way that they
never lose the connection with it, so that they all bear the imprint of something subjective.
46  d) All subsequent components of this continuum have to do with the fulfilment of an
essential feature of the preceding ones, namely the fact that each of them goes beyond
itself and implies something more than itself. In other words, each new step is something
the preceding components were already directed to and were already all about; the result
being that 2) expresses and fulfils 1), insofar as 1) goes itself beyond itself and implies
something more than itself), 3) expresses and fulfils 2) – and therefore 1) – insofar as both
1) and 2) go beyond themselves and imply something more than themselves, and so on
and so forth. 
47  e) On the whole, Fichte’s continuum of meine Wirksamkeit is divided into two segments: the
first is characterized by the fact that it belongs to the realm of subjectivity, while the
second belongs to the realm of objectivity. The point is that, even if 2) is more objective
than 1),  and 3)  is  more  objective  than 2)  (so  that,  for  instance,  one’s  will  is  more
objective than the designing of Zweckbegriffe), the fact remains that the result of this
Objektiverwerden (the result of this something-subjective-being-turned-into-something-




And in this regard the representation of my body marks the turning point. From 1) to 4)
(that is from I-hood to will) all Objektiverwerden remains in the confines of subjectivity.
Conversely,  from  6)  to  9)  all  stages  of  development  of  meine  Wirksamkeit are
characterized by the fact that they are supposed to take place beyond the confines of
subjectivity;  so  that  what characterizes  them  is  an  inversion  of  the  relation  of  forces
between what is subjective and what is objective, the result being that even if there are
still  some subjective components,  these have the nature of  subjective  elements  in  the
realm of objectivity. In short, the representation of my body makes the transition from the
field of subjectivity (where all objective elements are something objective in the realm of
subjectivity)  to  the  field  of  objectivity  (where  all  subjective elements  are  something
subjective in the realm of objectivity) – and combines both realms.70
48  f) But this is not all. What characterizes the representation of my body is not just the
fact  that  in  this  case  the  Objektiverwerden  (the  turning  of  something  subjective  into
something objective) goes beyond the confines of subjectivity, so that nothing less than
Stoff is involved. As mentioned before, Fichte’s point is that my body is characterized by
what we have termed an equation between will and body, I-hood and Stoff. In other words,
in Fichte’s view the representation of my body is intrinsically complex in the sense that
it  includes  both the representation of  the difference between my will  and Stoff  (and
therefore  between my will  and  that  part  of  the  realm of  Stoff that  is  immediately
subject to its influence) and the representation of their equation viz. of their complete
permeation (i.e. of something that is uno tenore will and Stoff, Stoff and I-hood).71
* * *
49  Now, all this may give the impression that one’s body is just a particular link in the
middle  of  this  very  complex  set  of  representations:  a  representation  among  many
others,  a  particular form of  declension des  Verhältnisses  des  Subjectiven,  und Objectiven
zueinander: something circumscribed and therefore isolable.
50  But this impression proves to be misleading.
51  On the one hand, Fichte’s point is precisely that my body is not just an intermediate
instance between the more subjective and the more objective components of the said
continuum.  His  point  is  that  such  a  thing  as  the  representation  of  my  body  is
intrinsically complex and presupposes (and contains in itself) the whole sequence, from
the  representation  of  I-hood  to  the  representation  of  my  will.  In  other  words,  the
representation of my body is not possible without the representation of I-hood, without
the representation of  myself  as  a real  force,  without the designing of  Zweckbegriffe,
without  the  representation  of  my  will  –and  then,  of  course,  a)  without  the
representation  of  a  sphere  of  “immediate  causality  of  the  will”  viz.  of  immediate
material starting points for my intervention in the realm of Stoff and b) without the
above-mentioned  representation  of  the  equation between  all  these  terms  (of  their
complete permeation,  i.e. of something that is uno tenore I-hood, real force, etc. –and
Stoff). And the point is that none of these representations can occur separately, that
they all entail and imply each other.
52  This is a very rough outline, and among other things it should be noted that everything
depends  on  three  crucial  points:  on  the  one  hand,  it  all  depends  both  a)  on  the
connection between what might be termed the manifold of my will (the “inner keyboard”




manifold of “immediate causality of my will” (the narrower manifold of immediate material
starting points for my intervention in the realm of Stoff,  that is,  the “inner keyboard”
Fichte’s articulate body is all about) and b) on the fact that these two “inner keyboards”
are equated and represented as one; on the other hand, it also depends c) on the fact that
the narrower manifold of “immediate causality of my will” (the narrower manifold of
immediate  material  starting  points  for  my  intervention  in  the  realm  of  Stoff)  is
represented as something stable, so that all my possible action is mediated by the very
same set of material starting points (by a stable portion of Stoff, etc.)72
* * *
53  But we have no time left to examine this point in any detail. Instead, we would like to
emphasize that there is still another reason why my body is not just a representation
among many others. As pointed out above, in Fichte’s view, the representation of my
body includes  the  representation  of  its  relation  with  everything  else  (at  least  with
everything else in the realm of Stoff) – and this all-encompassing net of connections is
as constitutive of my body as all the above. This is what Fichte’s description of 6), 7), 8)
and 9) is all about. Fichte’s claim is that the representation of my body is entailed in the
representation of the whole realm of Stoff viz. of the whole realm of objectivity, insofar
as the latter is represented as the realm of meine Wirksamkeit. So that, contrary to what
may seem to be the case, everything else is intrinsically related to my body and defined
in terms of its connection with it; the result being that the realm of objectivity has the
shape  of  what  might  be  described  as  a  centred  multiplicity or  a  centred  manifold:  a
multiplicity of concentric circles of objectivity, as it were, revolving around my body,
and constituted in such a way that everything in them defines itself a) both by being
and by not being changeable, i.e. both by being and by not being subject to my action
(that is to the action of my body) and b) by various degrees of proximity and distance
(N.B.  of  action-related proximity  and  distance)  to  their  being  acted  upon  by  meine
Wirksamkeit, that is by my body. 
54  The combination of these two insights shows that one’s body is not just an inflected form
among  many  others  in  the  framework  of  what  we  have  termed  the  declension des
Verhältnisses des subjectiven, und objectiven zueinander (the declension of the “relation of
what is subjective and what is objective to each other”). Fichte’s point is that my body is
essentially constituted both by a) all the other inflected forms that make it possible and
pave the way for it (namely the I, the I’s real force, the designing of Zweckbegriffe, and
my will)  and  b)  by  all  the  other  “inflected  forms”  of  the  said  relation  my body  is
intrinsically  related to (namely the realm of  Stoff –  and in this  realm both what is
changeable and what is unchangeable, that is, both the more subjective and the more
objective  side  of  it).  In  short,  my body –  this  particular  inflected  form of  the  said
relation – recapitulates and anticipates all the other inflected forms, and indeed so much
so that it is defined by (and by the same token defines) all of them.73
55  We must insist on this point. According to Fichte, there is something global about my
body, both a) in the sense that it defines itself by its relation to everything else and b) in the
sense that everything else defines itself by its relation to it. But this is not all – and in a way
it misses the decisive point. For the decisive point is that my body has a global character




else revolves: everything else “orbits” my body and is essentially defined by its practical –
i.e. by its action-related – connection with it. 
56  But there is something inaccurate in this account. To be more precise, one must say a)
that everything else revolves around the I and b) that everything else defines itself by
the particular way it revolves around the I – so that the latter is the real centre of the
centred manifold we are talking about. As for my body, it defines itself both a) by the fact
that it, too, revolves around the I (that it revolves around my I-hood, my activity, my
Zweckbegriffe,  my will),  so that it is intrinsically I-related,  and b) by the fact that it is
equated with the I and therefore partakes of its protagonist role – the result being that
everything else in the realm of Stoff revolves around my body. In other words, revolving
around my body is the way all Stoff revolves around me. And everything in the realm of Stoff 
defines itself  by different ways of being related to my articulated body and what it
stands for. On the one hand, all the different components of the realm of Stoff have in
common the fact  that they are intrinsically body-related (N.B.:  my-body-related) and
revolve around my articulated body. On the other hand, they differ from one another
both a) by their particular relation to my Zweckbegriffe and b) by their different position
with respect to my articulated body (viz. to what Fichte terms the various “starting
points” the articulated body is made of) – that is, they differ from one another by the
“direction  of  action”  in  which  they  are  to  be  found  and  acted  upon  and  by  their
“practical distance” (by different degrees of proximity and distance) to my articulated
body (viz. to the “starting points” it is made of): by the fact that they have to do with
short-range or long-range action, etc. 
57  As mentioned before, this is a crucial point. Fichte emphasizes that what appears to us
is not just a manifold (which as such could be de-centred or a-centred,  multi-centred or
whatever). On the contrary, the manifold appearing to us is of a very particular nature:
it  has  a  centred  character and  is  decisively  shaped  by  this  feature.  On  the  one  hand,
everything in it is intrinsically I-centred; and on the other hand, the whole realm of Stoff 
is  intrinsically  my-body-centred.  The  bottom  line  is  that  these  two  phenomena  are
closely connected with each other; for my body plays the said role in the realm of Stoff
precisely because it is equated with me – that is, because it is my body.74
* * *
58  But this is not all. There are still two further points to take into account. 
59  The first has to do with finitude viz. with the fact that my body is finite. As mentioned
before, my body represents a “bottleneck”, so to speak, in at least two senses. On the
one hand,  the sphere of  my articulated body (the “inner keyboard” of  what  Fichte
terms the immediate “starting points” of my action: the sphere of Stoff directly subject to
my will) is much narrower than the realm of my Zweckbegriffe – and indeed of my will.
On the other hand, the sphere of my articulated body (the part of the realm of Stoff that
is directly subject to my will) is also immeasurably smaller than the whole realm of Stoff.
As a matter of fact, it comprises only a very tiny portion of it. 
60  Let us take a closer look at this.
61  On the one hand, the point is that the sphere of my immediate action is limited: it does
not extend throughout the whole realm of Stoff. The latter is divided in two, not only
because, as mentioned before, it comprises both what can be changed and what cannot




subject to my will, and b) the realm of what is not directly subject to my will.76And this is
what Fichte’s characterization of the various points my articulated body is made of –
namely their characterization as “starting points” – is all about: they are not only points
of  intervention  in  the  realm  of  Stoff,  they  leave  room for  and  give  rise to  further
intervention or  further  action ( further transformation  of  the  realm of  Stoff).  In  other
words, the point is that there is no such thing as a sphere of direct intervention as wide
as the whole realm of Stoff: there is no such thing as a total body. Or, as we can also put it: a
significant part of the realm of Stoff is not my body.77 But, on the other hand, this is not
all; for what characterizes my articulated body is not only the fact that it is just a part of
the realm of Stoff: it is rather the fact that it represents only a very small part of the said
realm. And the question is: is this just a matter of fact or is there something more to it?
In Fichte’s view it is more than just a matter of fact. The relative smallness of one’s
body is intrinsically related to the possibility of further actions viz. of complex actions.
The  greater  the  sphere  of  direct  intervention  (i.  e.  the  greater  the  sphere
corresponding to my body), the smaller the room left for the continuation of my action
viz. for further action. The smaller the sphere of direct intervention (i.e. the smaller the
sphere corresponding to my body), the bigger the room left for the continuation of my
action viz. for further action. In other words, if my body were much bigger (and a fortiori
if the whole realm of Stoff played the role of my body), the remaining scope for further 
action viz. for complex action (the scope for possible action) would be much narrower.
Most possible actions would be accomplished uno tenore,  in one fell swoop. And pretty
much the same holds true for the relationship between my body and the manifold of
my Zweckbegriffe viz. between my body and my will. The point seems to be that there is
a correlation between the smallness of my body and the realm of possible action. One might
also say that there is an inverse proportion between the size of my body and the realm of
possible action.
62  In the Sittenlehre 1798 Fichte does not address this question in connection with the finite
size of my body. But he suggests something along these lines when he discusses the
question as to whether my body must be represented as something movable.
63  This brings us to the second point, namely the fact that, according to him, in order to
play its role as an essential component of meine Wirksamkeit, my body is, and has to be,
represented as movable (beweglich) – and indeed as something movable in many different
ways (eine mannichfaltige Beweglichkeit).
64  Let us take a closer look at this.
65  In §7 following on from his analysis of what he terms “Rang A” (“group A”),78 Fichte
depicts  a  chain  of  “practical  crossroads”,  or  rather  a  complex  network  of  chains  of  “
practical crossroads” that forms the structure of every continued (viz. of every complex) 
action: 
“To each of those points, moreover, several other points attach themselves, and in
and through these new points, mediated through the former ones, the I is able to
become a cause in manifold ways. I said that several [points are attached] to each one
[of the starting points]: for if, starting from each of these points, one could act in only
one way, then there would be no free acting beginning from the point in question,
and thus there would be no second acting at all, but only a continuation of the first.
Let us call this system [of secondary points attached to the original starting points]
“group B”.  To each single  point  of  group B there are attached,  in turn,  several
points of a third group, group C; and thus, to illustrate this with an image, around a
fixed middle point there is described an infinite circular area, within which each




66  Later on, in §9, he sums up his views on this topic in the following terms: 
“As a product of nature, therefore, I am matter; more precisely and in accordance
to  what  was  said  above,  I  am  organized  matter  that  constitutes  a  determinate
whole: I am my body. 
Furthermore, my will is supposed to be able to unite with me the things of nature or
to bring them into a relationship with me. This union or relationship is connected
with certain parts of my organized body, and my body is the immediate instrument
of my will. The parts in question must therefore stand under the dominion of my
will; and, since we are talking about spatial relationship, then these parts [of my
body], as parts, i.e., in relation to the whole of my body, must be movable, and my
body itself must be movable in relation to nature as a whole. Moreover, since this
movement  is  supposed  to  depend  on  a  freely  designed  and  indeterminately
modifiable concept,  my body must be movable in many different ways – Such a
construction of the body is called articulation. If I am to be free, then my body must
be articulated.”80
* * *
67  We have no time to discuss these matters in any detail. But it is important to highlight
some key points.
68  First, Fichte emphasizes that the relation between my body and the changes it gives rise
to in the realm of Stoff is not such that my body can do no more than trigger changes in
its immediate surroundings and powerlessly watch as these changes unleash a chain of
effects.  On  the  contrary,  the  “inner  keyboard”  of  the  above  mentioned  “starting
points” (the “starting points” the articulated body is made of) is, as it were, a changeable
keyboard: my body has the possibility to change what it is immediately attached to (it is
able to change its own situation: to change its connections –i. e., to change its relation
to other components of the manifold of Stoff). And this means that I can move my sphere
of direct intervention to another area of the realm of Stoff and thereby change what can
be immediately changed by my body; which in turn means that my efficacious action
(meine Wirkung) upon Stoff can be controlled and steered in a sequence of interventions. And
this makes all the difference: actions differ from one another not only because they
have different starting points (and are,  as it  were,  the rigid result  of  their starting
points);81 actions  differ  from each  other  because  there  is  such  a  thing  as  chains  of
actions82 (constituted in such a manner that action B is made possible by action A, action
C is made possible by action B, action D is made possible by action C, etc.). In other
words, actions can be multiplied because they take different routes or follow a different
combination of  steps.  The  very  same manifold  of  Stoff is  multiplied,  as  it  were,  by
different ways of touring it –that is, the very same field of possible action is multiplied by
a variety of courses of action; the result being what might be described as the practical
(viz. the action-related) counterpart of Leibniz’s idea of perspectival multiplication.83
69  Secondly,  this is what Fichte’s description of the connection between what he terms
“Rang A” (one’s immediate “starting points” –i. e., my body) and what he terms “Rang
B”, “Rang C”, “Rang D”, etc., etc.,84 is all about. Complex action has the form of a very
intricate network of possible changes of the position of my body relative to the other
components of the realm of Stoff (that is, a very complex network of modifications of
the distance between my body and the other components of the realm of Stoff – and this
means a very complex network of possible changes of what can be immediately changed by




crossroads”, leading to “practical crossroads”, leading to “practical crossroads”, etc. Or, to be
more precise, he speaks of a network of “practical crossroads” constituted in such a
way  that  each  path  leads,  in  turn  (and  leads  immediately)  to  a  further  “practical
crossroad”, and so on and so forth. As a result, the realm of Stoff (that is, the field of
meine  Wirksamkeit)  has  the  form  of  the  “infinite  circular area”  (the unendliche
Cirkelfläche) –the immense complex of concentric circles– he alludes to. And the point is
also that this complex of concentric circles is changeable –and that change is what it is
all about. In a way, this complex always has the same centre, for its centre is my body. But
the point is that the centre –namely my body– can move its position and thereby change the
form of the whole complex.
70  Thirdly, all this means that, in the final analysis, every single component of the realm of
Stoff is represented as a possible object of an immediate action of my body upon it –and
this is so even if the Stoff in question is at a huge distance from my body (so that an
immediate action  upon  it  presupposes  an  immense –and  even  a  de  facto impossible–
“voyage)”;  86 for  the  fact  that  the  “voyage”  viz.  the  action  in  question  cannot  be
performed does not change the way I represent distant Stoff: it is still represented as
the object of a possible immediate action (as something I would be able to act immediately
upon,  if  the  distance  separating  it  from my body could  be  negotiated).  And so  the
bottom line is this.  On the one hand, every object defines itself by this possibility of
immediate  action  upon  it.  On  the  other  hand,  my body  is  not  least  defined  by  its
connection  with  this  infinite  field  of  possible  immediate  action  (with  the  unendliche
Cirkelfläche –the “infinite circular area”– of possible immediate Wirkung Fichte refers to).
In short, my body defines itself as the “thing” that can bring itself to immediate action
or immediate Wirkung upon everything else. 
71  Fourthly, as the above quotes from §§ 7 and 987 clearly show, all this has to do with the
connection between my body (viz. what Fichte terms Artikulation) and Freisein viz. freie
Wirksamkeit. Fichte’s point is the correlation between a) my body as a finite articulated
body and b) the utmost multiplication of the field of possibility. In other words, Fichte tries
to show that there is an intrinsic correlation between my body (this tiny piece of Stoff –
that is, Pascal’s “reed”88) and the maximum expansion of the realm of possibility viz. the
maximum  diversity  of  possible  action.  In  Fichte’s  view,  the  former  is  a  condition  of
possibility for the latter.
* * *
72  But we must conclude. To be sure, this is not the whole story of Fichte’s account of my
body –both because  it  had to  be  somewhat  simplified  and because  there  are  other
equally important developments, and other chapters to this story. But I think it is a
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question of the connection between our representations and what is supposed to exist “in itself”.
First, he emphasizes that there are two sides to this question: “The first way in which what is
subjective  and  what  is  objective  are  unified,  or  viewed  as  harmonizing,  is  when  I  engage  in
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Secondly, he highlights the one-sidedness of the more common approach: “Up until now only the first
of these questions, the one concerning how we might come to assert the correspondence of our
representations with things that supposedly exist independently of those representations, has
been raised. Philosophy has as yet not even so much as wondered about the second point, that is,
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23. Ibid.
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28. SSL,  GA  I/5,  25  (FSW  IV,  7):  “Wo  und  in  wiefern  du  Thätigkeit  erblickst,  erblickst  du
nothwendig auch Widerstand; denn außerdem erblickst du keine Thätigkeit.”
29. SSL, GA I/5, 25 (FSW IV, 6): “[...] ganz abhängig, und durchaus gezwungen [...]”. Cf. SSL, GA I/
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30. SSL, GA I/5, 25 (FSW IV, 7): “ [...] daß ich mich als bloß erkennendes, und in dieser Erkentniß
von der Objectivität ganz abhängiges Subject betrachten muß.”
31. SSL, GA I/5, 26 (FSW IV, 8): “[…] daß das subjective durch das objective bestimmt seyn soll,
nicht aber umgekehrt [...]”. See also SSL, GA I/5, 25 (SW IV, 6): “[…] d. h. das subjective erscheint
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39. SSL, GA I/5, 24 (FSW IV, 5).
40. Viz. the separation and unification (Trennung und Vereinigung). Fichte also speaks of “trennen,
und doch als Eins ansehen” (SSL, GA I/5, 26/FSW IV, 8).
41. Cf. SSL, GA I/5, 21 (FSW IV, 1). See also SSL, GAI/5, 24, 26, and 29 (FSW IV, 6, 8, and 11).
42. SSL, GAI/5, 22 (FSW IV, 3).
43. SSL, GA I/5, 27 (FSW IV, 9): “Nun soll ich, das Eine, untheilbare Ich, thätig seyn; und das, was
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44. Cf. SSL, GA I/5, 27 (FSW IV, 9): “[....] diese Thätigkeit nicht anders breschreiben kann, denn als
eine Kausalität des Begriffs [...]”. He also speaks of “Kausalität durch den Begriff” (Ibid.)
45. SSL, GA I/5, 27 (FSW IV, 9): “[…] als eine Kausalität des bloßen Begriffs auf das objective,
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sondern absolut in, und durch sich selbst bestimmt ist.“
46. SSL, GA I/5, 27 (FSW IV, 10).
47. Ibid.
48. SSL, GA I/5, 27 (FSW IV, 9).
49. Cf. SSL, GA I/5, 27-28 (FSW IV, 9-10).
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51. SSL, GA I/5, 28 (FSW IV, 10).
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54. SSL, GA I/5, 28 (FSW IV, 11).
55. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 11).
56. SSL,  GA I/5,  28 (FSW IV,  11).  The question is, of  course,  whether this  principle does not
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upon Stoff, it seems inevitable that, at some point or other, my will (that is what is subjective)
must affect Stoff (what is objective) without the help, or mediation, of any Stoff. Fichte’s point seems




link bridging the gap between the two realms in question: in order for my will to have any effect
upon Stoff, it must have, as it were, some Stoff of its own. 
57. Ibid.
58. SSL, GA I/5, 28-29 (FSW IV, 11): “[…] und nur so weit, als diese unmittelbare Kausalität des
Willens geht, geht der Leib, als Werkzeug, oder die Artikulation.”
59. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 11).
60. As opposed to the Stoff that can be changed by one’s will only indirectly, namely by means of
the change of some other Stoff. 
61. Cf. Ibid. The full text is quoted in note 67 below.
62. Ibid.:  “Aber  diese  Unterscheidung  ist  nichts  anderes,  denn  eine  abermalige
Trennung  des  subjectiven  und  objectiven,  oder  noch  bestimmter,  eine  besondere
Ansicht  dieser  ursprünglichen  Trennung.  Der  Wille  ist  in  diesemVerhältnisse  das
subjective, und der Leib das objective.”
63. SSL, GAI/5, 29 (FSW IV, 12):  “Das durch meine Wirksamkeit veränderliche Ding,
oder die Beschaffenheit der Natur ist ganz dasselbe, was das unveränderliche, oder die
blosse  Materie  ist;  nur  angesehen  von  einer  andern  Seite;  eben  so wie  oben  die
Kausalität des Begriffs auf das objective, von zwei Seiten angesehen, als Wille und als
Leib erschien. ”
64. SSL, GA I/5, 28 (FSW SW IV, 11) (italics added).
65. So that the body, as Fichte puts it, is “the last item that I attribute to myself”: “[…]
das letzte, was ich zu mir rechne […].” (SSL, GA I/5, 29, FSW IV, 12) Incidentally, it
should  be  noted  that  what  we  are  dealing  with  here  is  Fichte’s  1798  answer  to  a
question raised by him in the second of his 1794 Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des
Gelehrten:  “[…] mit welcher Befugniß nennt der Mensch einen bestimmten Theil der
Körperwelt seinen Körper? wie kömmt er dazu, diesen seinen Körper zu betrachten, als
seinem Ich angehörig, da er doch demselben gerade entgegengesetzt ist?“ (“by what
authority does man call a particular portion of the physical world his body? how does
he come to consider this body as belonging to his Ego, whereas it is altogether opposed
to it (…)?”. (SSL, GA I/3, 34; FSW VI, 302). The translation is borrowed from Fichte, J. G.,
The Vocation of the Scholar, tr. W. Smith, London, J. Chapman, 1848, 26-27. It is almost
needless to add that a) much of what Fichte says on this topic in the SSL has a close
parallel both in his GNR (particularly in its first part) and in the Wissenschaftslehre nova
methodo, and b) the latter focus on other important aspects of the question. Moreover,
there are also other significant developments in Part II of the SSL itself. But a complete
analysis of all relevant aspects would go far beyond the scope of this paper. We must
concentrate on Fichte’s 1798 introductory remarks and leave out everything (or almost
everything) else.
66. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 11).
67. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 11-12): “Indem ein subjectives in mir selbst sich in ein objectives, der
Zweckbegriff in einen Willensentschluß, und dieser in eine gewisse Modification meines Leibes
verwandeln soll, stelle ich ja offenbar mich selbst vor, als verändert. Aber das letzte, was ich zu
mir rechne, mein körperlicher Leib, soll in Verbindung mit der gesamten Körperwelt stehen; wie
daher der erste als verändert angeschaut wird, wird nothwendig auch die letzte so erblickt.”
68. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 12): “Das durch meine Wirksamkeit veränderliche Ding, oder die
Beschaffenheit der Natur ist ganz dasselbe, was das unveränderliche, oder die bloße Materie ist;
nur  angesehen von einer  anderen Seite;  ebenso wie  oben die  Kausalität  des  Begriffs auf  das
objective, von zwei Seiten angesehen, als Wille und als Leib erschien. Das veränderliche ist die




dieselbe  Natur,  ganz  und  lediglich  objectiv  angesehen,  und  unveranderlich  aus  den  oben
angezeigten Gründen.”
69. It is to be noted that in his introductory remarks Fichte leaves out his own views on the
organized body and on the connection between what he terms the articulated and the organized 
body. Cf. SSL, GA I/5, 29 (FSW IV, 11): “This preliminary survey does not include that aspect of my
body known as organization [Organisation]”. On the organized body and on the connection between
the articulated and the organized body, see notably SSL, GA I/5, 44, 124f., 234f. (FSW IV, 29, 127f.
261f.), GNR §6, GA I/3, 373ff. (FSW III, 77ff.),  WL-nm §§ 11, 14, and 19, GA IV/2, 108ff.,  155ff.,
256ff., and GA IV/ 3, 418ff..
70. In  other  words,  my  body is  where  the  two realms  –the  realm of  subjectivity (I-hood,  my
activity, my Zweckbegriffe and my will) and the realm of objectivity (the realm of resistance to what
is subjective, i.e. the realm of resistance to me, to my activity, to my Zweckbegriffe, and to my will)–
come into contact with each other.
71. Put another way, my body stands out as being at the same time a) something opposed
to  subjectivity (I-hood,  my activity,  my Zweckbegriffe and my will)  –  for  it  is  Stoff:  it
belongs to the realm resistance to what is subjective, it is made of resistance to me, to my
activity, to my Zweckbegriffe, and to my will – and b) something equated with subjectivity
(something equated with me, with my activity, with my Zweckbegriffe and with my will).
Fichte does not put it in these terms, but it can be said that what distinguishes my body
is the fact that it has, as it were, the nature of an oxymoron.
72. In § 7 (SSL, GA I/5, 99-100, FSW IV, 98) Fichte depicts this stable set of starting
points  (that  is,  one’s  articulated body)  as  follows:  “The idea  governing the  deduced
series is as follows: First of all, there has to be some starting point where the I departs
from its original limitation and exercises causality for the first time and immediately;
and if it were for some reason impossible to carry the analysis all the way back to this
original starting point, there then might also appear to be a plurality of starting points.
Insofar as each of these points is supposed to be a starting point, the I is at each such
starting point  an immediate  cause,  through its  will,  and there are  no intermediate
elements through which it first has to acquire such causality. If the I is ever to be a
cause at all then there must be such starting points. […] we call these points, when
thought of collectively, our articulated body; and our articulated body is nothing but
these  same  [starting]  points  [of  efficacious  acting  in  the  world],  presented  in  and
realized through intuition. Let us call this system of the first moments of our causality
group  A”.  (Die  Idee  der  deducierten  Reihe  ist  folgende.  Es  muß  zuförderst  einen
Anfangspunkt  geben,  in  welchem  das Ich  aus  seiner  ursprünglichen  Beschräntheit
herausgeht, und zuerst und unmittelbar Kausalität hat; welcher, wenn es aus irgend
einem Grunde unmöglich seyn sollte, so weit zurück zu analysiren, auch wohl als eine
Mehrheit von Anfangspunkten erscheinen könnte. In wie fern es Anfangspunkte seyn
sollen, ist es in ihnen das Ich unmittelbar durch seinen Willen Ursache; es giebt keine
Mittelglieder, um nur erst zu dieser Kausalität zu gelangen. Solche erste Punkte mußte
es  geben,  wenn  das  Ich  überhaupt  je  Ursache seyn  sollte.  Diese  Punkte
zusammengedacht nennen wir [...] unsern articulirten Leib: und dieser Leib ist nichts
anders, als diese Punkte durch Anschauung dargestellt und realisiert. Man nenne dieses
System der ersten Punkte unserer Kausalität den Rang A.)
73. Or, to put it in the terms used by Fichte, my body is not just an Ansicht of the said Verhältnis
(of the “relation of what is subjective and what is objective to each other”) among the other
Ansichten Fichte refers to. The point is that this particular Ansicht – my body – is such that it both




74. In other words, Fichte puts his focus on the kind of centred multiplicity Hierocles alludes to in
his famous concentric circles (STOBAEUS, Anthologium, IV, ch. 27, sec. 23) – basically the very set of
phenomena Heidegger later termed das Umhafte.  See notably HEIDEGGER,  Gesamtausgabe 61, 96f.,
129, Gesamtausgabe 62, 91ff., Gesamtausgabe 63, 86, 102, Gesamtausgabe 64, 20ff., Gesamtausgabe 20,
230f.,  308f.,  SZ,  101ff.  On  the  connection  between  Fichte’s  views  on  this  subject  and  Stoic
οὶκείωσις, see CARVALHO,  M.  J.,  “The Concept of  Drive in the Sittenlehre (1798)  –  Fundamental
Aspects of Fichte’s ‘Doctrine of Oikeiosis’”, in Philosophy Today 52 (2008), 298-310.
75. This equally holds true for my body: as Stoff, it includes both elements. 
76. In the final analysis, this second division amounts, of course, to a subdivision of the realm of
what can be changed.
77. The fact that there is a sphere of direct intervention does not in itself mean that
this sphere must be finite. In this sense, my body could be infinite. And the point is that it
is not. 
78. That is, the system of “starting points” the articulate body is made of – see note 72 above.
79. SSL, GA I/5, 100 (FSW IV, 98-99): “An jeden dieser Punkte knüpfen sich nunmehrer andere
Punkte an, in denen vermittelst der ersten das Ich auf manichfaltige Weise Ursache werden kann.
Ich sage an Jeden Mehrere; denn wenn von jedem aus nur auf Eine Weise gehandelt werden könnte,
so würde von ihm aus nicht frei gehandelt, und es wäre überhaupt kein zweites Handeln, sondern
nur das fortgesetzte erste. Man nenne dieses System den Rang B. An jedes Einzelne von Range B.
Und wieder angknüpft mehrere Punkte eines dritten Ranges C.,  und so wird,  um ein Bild zu
geben, um einen festen Mittelpunkt eine unendliche Cirkelfläche beschrieben, in welcher jeder
Punkt als mit unendlich vielen grenzend gedacht werden kann.”
80. SSL, GA I/5, 123 (FSW IV, 127-128): “Nun ist das, was im Raume ist, und denselben ausfüllt,
Materie.  Ich  bin  sonach,  als  Naturprodukt,  Materie;  und  zwar  nach  dem  obigen  organisirte
Materie, die ein bestimmtes Ganzes ausmacht. Mein Leib.
Ferner es soll in der Botmäßigkeit meines Willens stehen, Naturdinge mit mir zu vereinigen, oder
in ein Verhältniß mit mir zu bringen. Nun bezieht diese Vereinigung oder dieses Verhältniß sich
auf  Theile  meines organisirten Leibes;  und dieser mein Leib ist  das  unmittelbare Instrument
meines Willens. Mithin müssen diese Theile unter der Herrschaft meines Willens stehen, und da
hier vom Verhältnis im Raume die Rede ist, sie müssen als Theile, d. i. in Beziehung auf das Ganze
meines Leibes, beweglich, und mein Leib selbst in Beziehung auf das Ganze der Natur, beweglich
seyn. Es muß, da diese Bewegung abhängen soll von einem frei entworfnen und ins unbestimmte
modificirbaren  Begriffe,  eine  mannichfaltige  Beweglichkeit  seyn.  –  Man  nennt  eine  solche
Einrichtung des Leibes Articulation. Soll ich frei seyn, so muß mein Leib articulirt sein.”
81. In  which  case  my action  (N.B.:  my  action  proper)  would  not  go  beyond  the  first  step;
everything else would be the work of Stoff itself. 
82. Viz. complex actions.
83. See notably LEIBNIZ, G. W., Monadologie, 57, in: Die philosophischen Schriften, ed. C. I.
Gerhardt, Berlin, Weidmann, 1875-1890, repr., Hildesheim, Olms, 1978, 616: “Et comme
un même ville regardée de differens côtés paroist tout autre et est comme multipliée
perspectivement, il arrive de même, que par la multitude infinie des substances simples,
il y a comme autant de differens univers, qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d’un
seul  selon  les  differens  points  de  veue  de  chaque  monade.”  See  also  Discours  de
Métaphysique IX, in: Die philosophischen Schriften, IV, 434: “De plus toute substance est
comme un monde entier et commun miroir de Dieu ou bien de tout l’univers, qu’elle
exprime  chacune  à  sa  façon,  à  peu  près  comme  une  même  ville  est  diversement
representée selon les differentes situations de celuy qui la regarde. Ainsi l’univers est




redoublée de même par autant de representations toutes differentes de son ouvrage.”
Cf. Die philosophischen Schriften I, 69, and III, 623.
84. We might also say: the first, the second, the third, the fourth circle, etc.
85. That is, a very complex network of modifications of the distance between my body
and the other components of the realm of Stoff. 
86. That is, an immense – and de facto impossible – action.
87. See above footnotes 79 and 80.
88. Cf. PASCAL, fr. 200 (Lafuma)/347 (Brunschvicg). See also 113 (Lafuma)/348 (Brunschvicg).
ABSTRACTS
This paper deals with some fundamental aspects of Fichte’s transcendental account of the body
in action, as laid down in the introductory remarks to his 1798 Sittenlehre. Fichte claims that the
representation of one’s body is part and parcel of the representation of “first-person” efficacious
action or of one’s Wirksamkeit überhaupt.  In his view, the latter cannot take place without the
former,  so  that  the  representation  of  one’s  body  is  necessarily  contained and  posited in  the
representation of one’s Wirksamkeit. Conversely, action – i. e. meine Wirksamkeit – is more than
just a particular feature of one’s body among many others: the representation of one’s efficacious
action is rather the framework within which the representation of one’s body is formed – it is
what constitutes one’s body (my body) as such. This paper tries to zoom in on the very complex set of
representations  that,  according  to  Fichte,  are  entailed  in  the  indissoluble  unity  of  this
fundamental representation: “my efficacious action/my body”.
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